Blaine J. Fowers, Lukas F. Novak, Alex J. Calder, Nona C. Kiknadze

Can a Theory of Human Flourishing be Formulated? Toward a Science of Flourishing

  • General Psychology
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Interest in the topic of human flourishing has burgeoned. This article discusses what is required for a general account of flourishing. It builds on three previous critiques of flourishing conceptualization that clarified the lack of systematic theorizing, the overemphasis on psychometric investigations, and the acultural manner of conceptualization. Addressing these difficulties is necessary to move toward a more cohesive, cumulative science of flourishing. The first theme of the article is a vital first step toward providing a systematic theory of flourishing. The article appropriates Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia (flourishing or good living) to contemporary concerns. The proposed Eudaimonic Theory defines flourishing, specifies its content in terms of human goods, discusses flourishing as a way of life (i.e., not a one-time achievement or subjective experience), and discusses virtue traits in a flourishing life. A second theme reaffirms the Aristotelian commitment to empirical (broadly conceived) verification. Psychometric evaluations of flourishing measures are useful, but insufficient evidence for a flourishing science. Therefore, hypotheses are provided for heuristic research guidance. The third theme is that flourishing must be made sufficiently capacious to accommodate the substantial cultural variation in flourishing conceptions. The article concludes with a promising proposal for formulating a general account of flourishing.

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