DOI: 10.1177/1023263x231224733 ISSN: 1023-263X

Digital euro and accountability of the European Central Bank

Seraina Grünewald
  • Law
  • Political Science and International Relations

The digital euro might be adopted as early as 2026 – a momentous decision, with profound societal consequences. And yet, little attention has been paid to the European Central Bank (ECB)'s accountability in the process of adoption and beyond. This article attempts to fill this void. It argues that the concept of ‘independent accountability’, still prevalent regarding monetary policy, is an inappropriate standard to hold the ECB accountable for its decisions on the digital euro for at least three reasons. First, while the ECB has the power to issue a digital euro with cash-like features, its mandate is not clear-cut, nor are its decisions merely technical in nature. Second, the digital euro affects areas in which the ECB has no specific expertise or authority, such as privacy, and its adoption requires an unprecedented level of coordination with the EU legislators. And third, it is not only public authorities with which the ECB must engage, but also market actors and citizens to ensure the digital euro's success. What emerges is a new accountability standard, with a broader range of ‘accountability stakeholders’ and a stronger role for ex ante consultations.