DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.3.103 ISSN: 1355-8250

Sentientism Still Under Threat: Reply to Dung

François Kammerer
  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Psychology (miscellaneous)
  • Philosophy
  • Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics

In 'Ethics Without Sentience: Facing Up to the Probable Insignificance of Phenomenal Consciousness' (Kammerer, 2022), I argued that phenomenal consciousness is probably normatively insignificant, and does not play a significant normative role. In 'Preserving the Normative Significance of Sentience' (Dung, 2024), Leonard Dung challenges my reasoning and defends sentientism about value and moral status against my arguments. Here I respond to Dung's criticism, pointing out three flaws in his reply. My conclusion is that the view that phenomenal consciousness is distinctively significant is still very much under threat.

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